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The New International Health
Regulations: An Historic
Development for International Law
and Public Health
DavidP. Fidlerand Lawrence 0. Gostin

new International Health Regulations (IHR)
he World
Health
Assembly
adopted the
on
May 23,
2005.1
The new(WHA)
IHR represent
culmination of a decade-long revision process and an
historic development for international law and public
health. The new IHR appear at a moment when public
health, security, and democracy have become intertwined, addressed at the highest levels of government.
The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, for example, identified IHR revision as a priority for moving humanity toward "larger freedom."2 This
article analyzes the new IHR and their implications for
global health and security in the 21st century.
The IHR and the Revision Process
The WHA instructed the WHO Director-General (DG)
to revise the IHR in 1995 because the Regulations did
not provide an effective framework for addressing the
international spread of disease. 3 Doubts about the
IHR's effectiveness had, however, been present long
before 1995.4 The critiques identified the narrow scope
of the regulations (applying only to a small number of
infectious diseases), the lack of compliance by states,
and the absence of a strategy for responding to rapid
changes in public health's global economic and technological environments.
The resurgence of infectious diseases in the 1980s
and 1990s highlighted the IHR's ineffectiveness. Particularly troublesome were the IHR's inapplicability
to the spread of endemic diseases, such as tuberculo-

sis and malaria, and new diseases, such as HIV/AIDS
and viral hemorrhagic fevers. Concern also existed that
some governments lacked the capacity or political will
to report and respond to diseases of international importance. By 1995, WHO understood that the revised
IHR would have to break with traditional approaches
and construct a novel framework for health and security in an era of accelerating globalization. The innovative framework began to emerge with WHO's first
proposal in January 1998, which had a broad scope and
5
permitted the use of non-governmental data sources.
The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) in 2003 accelerated the IHR revision process.
WHO viewed its response to SARS as a "roll-out" of
ideas being crafted in the IHR revision process. 6 In
the wake of WHA resolutions on SARS and the IHR
revision process in May 2003, 7 WHO issued a com-

plete proposed text in January 2004, which served as
the basis for WHO's regional consultations through
the spring and summer of 2004. 8 These consultations
led to a revised proposed text, issued in September
2004 for the first intergovernmental negotiations held
in November 2004. 9 Following the first negotiating
session, the Chair of the negotiations promulgated a
"Chair's text" for consideration at the second negotiating session in February 2005.10 The negotiations were
completed in May 2005 prior to the WHA's annual
meeting," at which the Assembly adopted the new
IHR.
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The New IHR: An Important Development in
Global Health Governance
The new IHR contain 66 articles organized into ten
parts and include nine annexes (see Table). The purpose of the new IHR is "to prevent, protect against,
control and provide a public health response to the
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks,
and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade" (Article 2). The IHR seek to
balance the state's right to protect its people's health
with obligations to take health-protecting actions in
ways that do not unnecessarily interfere with international trade and travel.
The new IHR capture this balancing task by providing that "States have.. .the sovereign right to legislate
and to implement legislation in pursuance of their
health policies. In doing so they should uphold the
purpose of these Regulations" (Article 3.4). By calibrating health and trade interests, the IHR resonate
with international trade law under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which also recognizes the state's
right to restrict trade for health purposes but limits
this right to ensure that restrictions are necessary. 12
The synergies between the new IHR and international
Table
Structure and Content of the New 9HR

trade law emphasize that public health is embedded
in an international system that facilitates economic
activity through globalized markets. Finding effective
ways of balancing public health and international economic activity has become critically important to the
success of international trade and international health
governance.
The new IHR radically depart from the traditional
approach informing the old IHR. The new IHR transform the international legal context in which states will
exercise their public health sovereignty in the future. As
examined below, the new IHR expand the scope of the
IHR's application, incorporate international human
rights principles, contain more demanding obligations
for states parties to conduct surveillance and response,
and establish important new powers for WHO.
The transformative nature of the new IHR connects
to growing consensus on the importance of public
health to global governance in the 21st century. Over
the decade during which the IHR revision unfolded,
it became apparent that public health had emerged as
critical to virtually every major global governance issue,
ranging from national and international security, trade,
and economic development, to environmental protection and human rights. The new IHR not only transform the traditional approach to
international disease spread but
they also represent a politically
important opportunity for public health to engage expansively
with the international community.
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Scope of the New IHR: An
All-Risks Approach
As indicated above, the old IHR
applied only to a short list of infectious diseases whose spread
was historically associated with
trade and travel (e.g., cholera,
plague, and yellow fever). The
Regulations now encompass
public health risks whatever
their origin or source (Article
1.1), including: (1) naturally
occurring infectious diseases,
whether of known or unknown
etiological origin; (2) the potential international spread of
non-communicable diseases
caused by chemical or radiological agents in products moving
in international commerce; and
(3) suspected intentional or acJOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
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cidental releases of biological, chemical, or radiological
substances.
This "all risks" approach embodies an important conceptual shift concerning public health's role in the IHR.
Trade calculations determined the old IHR's scope, but
risks to human health define the new IHR's scope. The
result is a set of rules with more public health legitimacy, flexibility, and adaptability. This expanded public health approach is found throughout the new IHR.
Reporting health events, handling epidemiological
data, making WHO recommendations, and limiting
national health measures apply across the spectrum of
health events. The expanded scope creates a more demanding framework than anything that ever appeared
in the traditional approach.
Incorporation of Human Rights Principles:
Autonomy, Privacy, and Liberty
The traditional approach to international disease
spread developed prior to the emergence of international human rights law. The new IHR incorporate
human rights principles, recognizing the effects of public health interventions on civil and political rights, such
3
as security of person and freedom of movement.1
The New IHR and GeneralHuman Rights Principles
The new IHR proclaim that "[t]he implementation
of these Regulations shall be with full respect for the
dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of
persons" (Article 3.1). This provision raises the question whether the new IHR conform to existing international human rights principles. For a public health
measure to restrict a civil and political right lawfully,
the measure must (1) respond to a pressing public or
social need; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; (3) be proportionate to the legitimate aim; and (4) be no more restrictive than is required to achieve the purpose sought
by restricting the right. 14 The rights-restricting measure must also be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 2.1 and 26). Individuals
deprived of liberty must be treated with humanity and
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person
(ICCPR, Article 10.1).
The new IHR generally reflect the requirements
in international human rights law. The Regulations
require states parties to identify a public health risk
that justifies imposing health measures against persons (Articles 23.2, 31.1, 31.2, and 43.1), apply an appropriate health response to such risk (Articles 23.2,
23.5, 30, 31.2, and 43.2), and implement measures
that are no more intrusive or invasive of persons than
reasonably available alternatives that would achieve
the level of health protection desired (Articles 23.2,

31.2, and 43.1). These disciplines also apply to WHO

recommendations made under the new IHR (Article
17). All health measures must be applied in a transparent and non-discriminatory way (Article 42). In addition, states parties must treat travelers with respect for
their dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms
and minimize any discomfort or distress associated
with health measures, including by treating them with
courtesy and respect; taking into consideration their
gender, socio-cultural, ethnic, or religious concerns;
and providing adequate food, water, accommodation,
baggage protection, medical treatment, and means of
communication for quarantined or isolated travelers
(Article 32).
The extent to which the new IHR incorporate human
rights principles means that international human
rights law is relevant to the interpretation and implementation of the new IHR. 15 The Regulation's incorporation of human rights will suffer, however, if states
parties do not integrate human rights thinking into
the operation of their respective public health systems.
As human rights problems with HIV/AIDS and other
public health concerns suggest, making the new IHR's
human rights elements effective will require commitment and vigilance. WHO and states parties should
have human rights principles in mind as they build the
public health capacities required by the new IHR.
Informed Consentand Privacy
The new IHR also contain provisions on the important
human rights areas of informed consent and privacy.
States parties cannot apply health measures to travelers without their prior express informed consent, except in situations that warrant compulsory measures
(Articles 23.3 and 31.2). The new IHR also reflect the
right to privacy by requiring states parties to preserve
the confidentiality of personally identifiable information they receive from other states parties or WHO
(Article 45.1). States parties and WHO must ensure
that disclosure and processing of personal information in order to address a public health risk protects
individual privacy (Article 45.2). The Regulations also
require WHO to respond to individuals who want to
review personally identifiable data WHO possesses
about them (Article 45.3).
Although an improvement over the traditional approach in terms of recognizing the importance of informed consent and privacy, problems and questions
remain. For example, the new IHR fall short in terms
of protecting human rights with regard to compulsory
measures applied in the absence of informed consent.
The rules relevant to compulsory measures only oblige
states parties to apply the least intrusive and invasive
measure with respect to medical examinations but not

DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND THE END OF HUMAN LIFE * SPRING 2006

INDEPENDENT

The new IHR require WHO to share information
it receives from non-governmental source s with
all states parties and relevant intergovern mental
organizations when necessary to enable r esponses
to public health risks.
to vaccinations, other prophylaxis, isolation, or quarantine (Articles 23.2 and 31.2). In addition, the Regulations do not include due process protections necessary
when states apply compulsory measures.
In terms of privacy, the new IHR mandate confidential treatment of personal health data by states parties
"as required by national law" (Article 45.1). Similarly,
the requirement of states parties to protect privacy
in addressing public health risks must be fulfilled "in
accordance with national law" (Article 45.2). These
provisions may make privacy protections under the
new IHR relative to disparate levels of national privacy
protection rather than subject to internationally recognized privacy standards.

National Public Health Capacities:
Surveillance and Response
The new IHR require states parties to develop,
strengthen, and maintain core surveillance and response capacities (Articles 5.1 and 13.1 and Annex
1). The old IHR had requirements for public health
capabilities only at points of entry and exit. The farreaching provisions in the new IHR shore up major
weaknesses in global strategies created by inadequate
national surveillance and response capabilities.
The new IHR reflect, however, states' concerns about
sovereignty. States parties do not have to fulfill the capacity obligations until 2012 - five years after the new
IHR enter into force in 2007 (Articles 5.1 and 13.1). A
state party can obtain a two-year extension by submitting a justified need and an implementation plan to
WHO (Articles 5.2 and 13.2); and, in exceptional circumstances, it can request a further two-year extension
that the DG has the power to grant or deny (Articles
5.2 and 13.2).
Although the new IHR's provisions on surveillance
and response capacities recognize the critical need for
capacity building, questions remain about the handling
of this issue. The most pressing question concerns the
availability of financial and technical resources needed
to improve national core capacities, especially in developing and least developed countries. WHO's duties to
provide surveillance and response assistance (Articles
5.3, 13.3, and 13.6) do not address its own shortage of
funds and personnel. The new IHR also contain no
obligations on states parties to provide financial and

technical resources to support capacity-building. Although the new IHR
urge states parties to provide financial and technical resources, these
provisions are either non-binding
(Article 13.5) or weak (Article 44.1).
Given the financial demands created
by other global health problems, such
as increasing access to HIV/AIDS treatment16 and
meeting the health-related Millennium Development
Goals,"7 the new IHR's silence on how the economic
demands of the core capacity objectives will be met is
a serious problem for which the new IHR provide no
apparent answers or strategies.
Notification Obligations: Reporting
Health Events to WHO
The new IHR require states parties to notify WHO of
all events within their territories that may constitute
a public health emergency of international concern
(Article 6), defined as "an extraordinary event which
is determined.. .(i) to constitute a public health risk to
other States through the international spread of disease
and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response" (Article 1.1). A "decision instrument"
is used to guide states parties in determining whether a
disease event may constitute a public health emergency
of international concern (Annex 2) (See Figure).
In keeping with the new IHR's expanded scope, the
notification obligations reflect a radically different, and
more demanding, approach to addressing the international spread of disease. The notification provisions
place a premium on states parties having sufficient surveillance capacities to detect disease incidents, assess
them under the decision instrument, and report disease
events that may constitute public health emergencies
of international concern. As discussed above, whether
many WHO member states have, or can develop, surveillance capacities sufficient to support these notification obligations remains a serious question.
Another problem looms for the new IHR's notification requirements. States parties often violated the old
IHR by failing to report cases of diseases subject to the
Regulations because they feared other countries would
implement economically damaging trade or travel restrictions.18 Will the more expansive and demanding
notification requirements in the new IHR avoid the
wide-spread non-compliance that undermined the old
IHR? Answering this question requires considering
the new IHR's approach to information supply and
verification, which constitutes its strategy for countering non-compliance with notification obligations.
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Figure
Decision Dnstrument for the Assessment and Notification of Events that May Constitute a Public Health
(Emergency of nlnternationa Concern (Mew 0OHR, Annex 2)

Events detected by national surveillance system (see Annex I [of the new IHR])

A case of the following diseases is
unusual or unexpected and may
have serious public health impact,
and thus shall be notifieda b:
* Smallpox
* Poliomyletitis due to wildtype poliovirus
* Human influenza caused by
a new subtype
* Severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS)

OR
30

Any event of potential
international public health
concern, including those
of unknown causes or
sources and those involving other events or
diseases than those listed
in the box on the left and
the box on the right shall
lead to utilization of the
algorithm.

OR
4E

Is the public health impact o fthe
event serious?

An event involving the following
diseases shall always lead to utilization of the algorithm, because they
have demonstrated the ability to
cause serious public health impact
and to spread rapidly internationallyb:
* Cholera
* Pneumonic plague
* Yellow fever
* Viral haemorrhagic fevers
(Ebola, Lassa, Marburg)
* West Nile fever
* Other diseases that are of
special national or regional
concern, e.g., dengue fever,

~.'

Qift V "ll

,f

,nr
nll

o;n-

men111-

gococcal disease.

Is the event unusual
or unexpected?

Yes

_

Yes

No

Is there a significant risk of international
spread?

Yes

Is the event unusual
or unexpected?

No

Isthere a significant risk of international
spread?

No

Not notified at this
stage. Reassess when
more information
becomes available.

EVENT SHALL BE NOTIFIED TO WHO UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGLJLATIONS

a As per WHO case definitions.
bThe disease list shall be used only for purposes of these Regulations.
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Data and Verification Provisions:
Unofficial Sources of Information
The old IHR limited WHO to officially using information provided by states parties. This limitation handicapped WHO's ability to respond to disease events
if a government refused to notify WHO of incidents,
supply needed information, or otherwise cooperate.
By contrast, the new IHR allow WHO to "take into
account reports from sources other than notifications
or consultations" from or with governments and to
seek verification of such information from states parties in whose territories the events are allegedly occurring (Articles 9.1 and 10.1). States parties must respond
to WHO verification requests (Article 10.2). The new
IHR require WHO to share information it receives
from non-governmental sources with all states parties
and relevant intergovernmental organizations when
necessary to enable responses to public health risks
(Article 11.1).
From the beginning of the IHR revision process,
WHO identified access to non-governmental sources
of information as critical to constructing an effective
global surveillance system. 19 Harnessing new information technologies, such as the Internet, for global
surveillance has been at the heart of WHO's Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN).
GOARN - a collaborative network of institutions and
experts that pools human and technical resources for
rapid identification, confirmation, and response to
outbreaks of international importance - is centrally
20
important to the new IHR's functioning.
WHO demonstrated the power of having access to
non-governmental sources of information during the
SARS outbreak.21 Globalization has significantly decreased the state's ability to control the flow of epidemiological information into and out of its territory, and
thus its prospects of keeping serious disease events hidden from international scrutiny. The avian influenza
outbreaks in Asia also teach this lesson.
WHO's access to non-governmental information, its
authority to request verification from states parties,
and its power to share such information with the international community increase incentives for states
parties to comply with the notification requirements.
Further, the new IHR's information and verification
provisions mitigate the consequences of non-compliance with notification obligations because WHO will,
in all likelihood, learn of disease events through other
sources, triggering the information verification and
dissemination processes. The best chance states parties have to minimize adverse economic consequences
from disease events is to be transparent and cooperate with WHO and other countries in addressing the
threats. In short, the information and verification pro-

visions privilege global health governance over state
sovereignty.
The new IHR contain, however, a provision that
bears watching to see how it affects the flow of nongovernmental information. The Regulations require
WHO to share non-governmental information with
states parties "and only where it is duly justified may
WHO maintain the confidentiality of the source" (Article 9.1). The general requirement on WHO to disclose
the source of non-governmental information might
deter non-state actors from supplying WHO with information, particularly individuals living under authoritarian regimes. In contrast to its protections for
confidentiality of health-related personal information,
the Regulations generally require WHO to supply information on persons who are non-official sources of
information. The new IHR provide no guidance for determining under what circumstances WHO would be
justified in maintaining the confidentiality of non-state
sources. Such determinations might involve WHO having to assess the likelihood that governments may punish individuals in their jurisdictions for disseminating
disease-related information. Thus, decisions to protect
confidentiality of non-state sources will likely involve
political controversy for WHO.
Declaration and Recommendation Powers
The new IHR grant two other important powers to
WHO that never appeared in the old IHR. First, the
new IHR accord WHO the authority to determine
whether a disease event constitutes a public emergency
of international concern (Article 12). States parties
have to notify disease events that may constitute such
emergencies, but the DG determines if disease events
are public health emergencies of international concern.
Although the DG must consult with states parties in
whose territories disease events are occurring, he or
she is not bound to follow their views. In other words,
a state party's refusal to cooperate does not bar WHO
action.
Second, if the DG determines that a public health
emergency of international concern is occurring, then
he or she shall issue non-binding, temporary recommendations to states parties on the most appropriate
ways to respond (Article 15). The DG may also issue
non-binding, standing recommendations on routine,
periodic application of health measures for specific,
ongoing public health risks (Article 16). The new IHR
contain criteria for issuing temporary or standing recommendations (Article 17) and examples of the kinds
of measures WHO could recommend (Article 18).
These powers allow WHO to provide leadership on
what health measures are appropriate from scientific
and public health perspectives and on the proper ways
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
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to balance health protection with respect for human
rights and acknowledgement of trade concerns.
Permissible Health Measures: Limits on
National Public Health Interventions
States parties to the new IHR are not legally bound
to follow WHO temporary or standing recommendations; but the new IHR contain binding limits on the
types of health measures states parties can take against
public health risks. These limits are designed to ensure
adequate health protection with minimal interference
with international traffic and respect for human rights.
Generally, states parties cannot require an invasive
medical examination, vaccination or other prophylaxis
as a condition of entry for any traveler (Article 31.1);
nor can a state party require any health document for
travelers other than those permitted by the new IHR
or recommended by WHO (Article 35). The new IHR
also regulate measures states parties can apply to ships,
aircraft, goods, and containers (Articles 25-29, 33-34,
and 41) and harmonize the types of health documents
required from ships and aircraft (Articles 37-39).
The new IHR permit states parties to apply health
measures that achieve the same or greater level of
health protection than WHO recommendations or that
are otherwise prohibited by the IHR (Article 43.1).
Such health measures must be based on scientific principles, available scientific evidence, relevant guidance
or advice from WHO, and cannot be more restrictive
of international traffic or more invasive or intrusive
to persons than reasonably available alternatives that
would achieve the level of health protection sought
(Articles 43.1-43.2).

These provisions resemble the approach taken to
health-protecting measures in WTO agreements, such
as the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Unlike the
SPS Agreement, however, the new IHR do not have
a strong enforcement mechanism if states parties fail
to comply with the obligations on permissible health
measures. Enforcement of the SPS Agreement benefits
from the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process.
Dispute settlement in the new IHR is essentially voluntary (Article 56). Failure by states to comply with the
old IHR undermined their effectiveness. The lack of an
enforcement mechanism in the new IHR may mean
that non-compliance with rules on permissible health
measures becomes a problem.

Rejections and Reservations
As a treaty, the new IHR cannot legally bind states unless they consent to be bound. Therefore, states can reject the new IHR (Article 61) or formulate reservations
to provisions to which they refuse to be bound (Article

62). The changes made by, and the more demanding
nature of, the new IHR may create incentives for states
to reject the revised Regulations or formulate reservations. A reservation becomes effective (1) if less than
one-third of relevant states object to the reservation
(Article 62.5); or (2) if at least one-third of relevant
states object to the reservation, and the reserving state
does not withdraw the reservation, when the WHO
by majority vote approves the reservation as compatible with the IHR's object and purpose (Article 62.9).
Rejections and reservations have to be made within 18
months of the date of the new IHR's adoption (Article
59.1). The United States has already indicated that it
will submit a "narrowly tailored" reservation providing
that it will implement the IHR in a manner consistent
with American federalism. 22 The process of making
and reviewing reservations bears monitoring because
of the potential for reservations to weaken the new
IHR's universal application.
Political Controversies in the
IHR Reform Process
Three political conflicts emerged during the negotiations to revise the IHR that threatened to stall or even
prevent final adoption: conflicts of law with other international regimes; the role of WHO in combating
biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism; and the
relationship of Taiwan to the new IHR regime.
Conflicts ofInternationalLaw
WHO member states expressed concerns that the expanded scope of the new IHR would bring the Regulations into conflict with other international agencies and treaties that addressed cross-border health
risks - e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency
(nuclear accidents); 23 the World Trade Organization
24
(health measures that restrict international trade);
and the Codex Alimentarius Commission (food standards and guidelines to protect consumer health and
promote trade in safe products). WHO addressed these
concerns by demonstrating that few conflicts existed;
amending the negotiating text to remove the small
number of possible conflicts;25 and adding provisions
to facilitate cooperation and coordination between
WHO and other international organizations (e.g., Articles 14, 17(f), 57.1).
Biological, Chemical,andNuclear Terrorism
How the revised IHR would apply to suspected intentional releases of biological, chemical, and radiological agents proved highly controversial. Negotiating
drafts required states parties to share information with
WHO if they had evidence of a suspected intentional
release of a biological, chemical, or radiological agent.
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This proposal reflected the belief that appropriate public health responses were needed whether the risk was
naturally occurring, accidental, or intentionally caused.
However, the proposal was politically charged as it
touched on issues of national and international security
related to weapons of mass destruction. Concern was
expressed that WHO's public health mission could be

to, public health risks (Article 2). Provision of information under Article 7 is no different than the provision of
information for any disease event or public health risk
to which the new IHR apply, meaning that WHO would
be focused on the health risk only. "Health measure" is
defined to exclude law enforcement or security measures (Article 1.1). Although information WHO gath-

Less clear is whether the new IHR might embroil WHO in the politics
of national and international security to the detriment of its core public
health functions. Although it makes some experts uncomfortable, the
potential for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction
connects public health to security concerns.
compromised if it had to investigate whether states had
violated arms control treaties or UN Security Council
6
resolutions.2
The new IHR handle these concerns awkwardly,
reflecting difficult negotiations. The new IHR do not
contain any specific requirement on information-sharing concerning suspected intentional releases. What
remains is a weaker provision: "If a State Party has evidence of an unexpected or unusual public health event
within its territory, irrespective of origin or source,
which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, it shall provide WHO with all relevant public health information" (Article 7). However,
this article, combined with the expanded scope, makes
clear that the new IHR apply to a suspected intentional
release of a biological, chemical, and radiological agent.
The understanding issued by the United States that
the new IHR apply to all "health threats - chemical,
biological, and radiological - and all causes and modes
of events - regardless whether they are naturally occur27
ring, accidental, or deliberate" is correct.
Less clear is whether the new IHR might embroil
WHO in the politics of national and international security to the detriment of its core public health functions. Although it makes some experts uncomfortable,
the potential for terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction connects public health to security concerns.
The anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 demonstrated that public health responses to bioterrorism
are critical aspects of national and homeland security.
The new IHR recognize this unfortunate reality.
At the same time, the new IHR limit WHO's role to
public health activities in these security-sensitive contexts. The new IHR's purpose states that the Regulations involve prevention, protection, control, and response activities concerning the international spread
of disease in ways commensurate with, and restricted

ers and analyzes would be important in assessments of
whether a state violated obligations under arms control
agreements or Security Council resolutions, the new
IHR do not put WHO in the position of making such
assessments.
Despite these attempts to contain WHO's role in situations involving possible violations of arms control and
other security obligations, the new IHR do not settle
the controversies about WHO's relationship to security
concerns related to weapons of mass destruction. Following recommendations made by a high-level panel
of experts 28 and the UN Secretary-General,29 the Security Council could decide to intervene in a situation
involving naturally occurring diseases or a suspected
intentional release of biological, chemical, or radiological agents in a way that involves WHO in politically
difficult circumstances. Whether such an intervention
by the Security Council would be warranted is not an
issue that the new IHR could address.
The Taiwan Problem
The standoff between China and Taiwan entered the
politics of the IHR revision process. Following the
SARS outbreak in 2003, during which Taiwan required
assistance from WHO, Taiwan advocated for being included in the new IHR regime. Taiwan argued that the
new IHR should have universal geographical coverage
to be effective in the era of globalized disease threats.
During the negotiations, China refused to allow Taiwan
to participate formally in the new IHR.
What remains of this controversy is found in the principle that "[t]he implementation of these Regulations
shall be guided by the goal of their universal application
for the protection of all people of the world from the
international spread of disease" (Article 3.3). Taiwan
interprets this provision as "a basis for Taiwan to make
contact with the WHO directly without China's interJOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS
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ference."30 China disagrees and points to a memorandum it negotiated with WHO in May 2005 that requires
China's consent before WHO has any direct contact
with Taiwan. 31 In short, the new IHR do not resolve
the Taiwan-China problem, nor could the IHR revision
process be expected to produce rapprochementbetween
Taiwan and China.
The New IHR and the Future of
Global Health Governance
The new IHR contain an international legal regime
unprecedented in the history of the relationship between international law and public health. The revised
Regulations promise to become a centerpiece for global
health governance in the 21st century. As the UN Secretary-General's support for the IHR revision illustrates,32
the new IHR have global governance significance far
beyond anything contemplated under, or achieved by,
the old IHR. Whether the issue involves international
security, trade, economic development, environmental
degradation, UN reform, or human rights, policy makers and experts have identified public health as a central
governance challenge nationally and internationally in
the 21st century. The transformational nature of the
new IHR create a regime that has the potential to contribute significantly to the general global governance
mission of improving national and international health.
The Regulations provide a framework that supports
not only improved international cooperation on health
but also the strengthening of national health systems,
producing more robust health governance horizontally
among states and vertically within them.
The new IHR's novelty should not, however, obscure
hard realities facing its future. WHO was systematically using non-governmental surveillance information
from GOARN's establishment in 1998, well before the
IHR revision process was completed; and this strategy
would have continued whether or not the new IHR had
been adopted. More difficult issues arise with producing effective responses to identified public health risks.
For decades, WHO has issued recommendations on
many public health problems; but the mixed record of
state compliance with WHO guidance should temper
enthusiasm for the new IHR's recommendation provisions. The political controversies that surrounded
WHO's more aggressive actions during SARS may
deter WHO from taking similar actions under the new
IHR. Laments about the erosion of global and local
public health capabilities suggest that WHO's decadeslong effort to improve health conditions in developing countries has also met with only qualified success.
The new IHR will not change this dynamic overnight,
particularly when the Regulations generate no fresh
financial resources to support capacity-building. Coin-

pliance with international legal restrictions against the
implementation of health measures that unnecessarily
restrict trade or infringe on human rights has not, in the
past, been stellar, as illustrated by how non-compliance
helped destroy the old IHR's effectiveness. Whether the
quantity and quality of compliance with the new IHR's
rules on health measures are better will not depend
on any improved enforcement mechanism because the
Regulations do not create one.
The new IHR are no "magic bullet" for global health
problems. Previous transformations in international
law's relationship with public health have, over time,
atrophied into insignificance. The history of the old
IHR tells just such a story. Further, the new IHR's relevance to some pressing global health problems, such
as increasing access to HIV/AIDS treatment in the developing world or stemming the "brain drain" of health
workers from developing to developed countries, 33 is
not apparent. Controversies and problems surrounding
the threat of avian influenza also suggest that the new
IHR do not cut through the tangled knot of very hard
political, economic, scientific, and public health choices
governments must make to address this public health
emergency of international concern.
The new IHR are the product of a decade of work by
WHO and its member states, and the revised Regulations have been designed to be a robust governance
framework far into the future. Harvesting the new IHR's
benefits for global health requires understanding not
only the difficulties this task faces but also the potential
the Regulations represent. At present, this potential exists mainly on paper, which is why the implementation
phase is critical. WHO needs to approach implementation with the energy and vision it demonstrated during
SARS. The seminal achievement of the new IHR constitutes only the end of the beginning. The hard work
of making this transformative revision of global health
governance effective for individuals, states, and the international community now begins.
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